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Gynaetopia: 
Feminine Genealogies of Common Law 
PETER GOODRICH* 
In order to make an ethics of sexual difference possible, it is necessary to retrace the ties of 
feminine genealogies ... at the levels of law, religion, language, truth and wisdom . .. [l]t is 
necessary to introduce into the history of reason an interpretation of the forgetting of 
feminine genealogies and thereby re-establish their economy.• 
Criticisms of law and of the legal profession from feminine perspectives 
considerably pre-date the various phases of modern feminist movements. In 
many respects, lawyers were a privileged object of feminine critique while the 
law itself represented the essential reason, antagonism, and distance that 
characterized the masculine domination of the polity. The correspondence of 
women married to barristers of the Elizabethan Bar indicate that it was 
emotionally unfortunate and domestically undesirable to attach oneself to 
men of law. Lawyers, it was said, married for venal motives, namely money, 
social advancement, and political influence; they were married first and 
exclusively to their profession; they were mean-spirited, cavilling and much 
absent; the law consumed them and left them spent, deprived of civility, 
humour, and emotion. 2 A slightly later tract, In Defence of the Female Sex, 
summarizes the failings of lawyers in terms of 'eager and disputative' men 
whose undoubted wit and judgement was expended in 'thwarting and 
opposing one another' to the effect that they became 'impatient, sour ... 
morose' and incapable of conversation. The evidence explicitly offered for this 
observation was the training that lawyers received at the Inns of Court, where 
students led 'a recluse and monastic life, and converse little with our sex. They 
want neither wit nor learning ... yet when they come into gay, though 
ingenious company, are either damped and silent or unseasonably frolicsome 
and free, so that they appear either dull or ridiculous'. 3 
It is not the purpose of this essay to rehearse directly the perennial and 
frequently barren terrain of the social incompetence, subjective estrangement 
or emotional ineptitude oflawyers. Such criticism is better read against a series 
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of constitutional texts which not only argued the political and legal pre-
eminence of women but also suggested the possible presence of a feminine 
genealogy repressed within the ancient constitution.4 At a popular level, the 
misogyny of English law and the 'dissembling practice' of its lawyers were 
countered in terms of female courts, women's law and feminine justice. The 
anonymous theatrical polemic, Swetnam the Woman-Hater arraigned by 
Women, places the misogynist author of a tract published in 1615, entitled The 
Arraignment of Lewde, Idle, Froward and Unconstant Women, on trial before a 
specially constituted women's court presided over by a 'Ladie Chiefe Justice'. 5 
The sentence passed by this 'Female Court' upon the misogynist was 
(ironically) that he be silenced, that is, deprived of speech, and exiled. 6 The 
pseudonymous Ester Sowernam responded to the same misogynist pamphlet 
by presenting a striking defence of women in the form of a genealogy of the 
feminine extracted from the Bible, mythology, and other ancient histories. She 
systematically listed the achievements of great women, the lineage of feminine 
rulers, and the virtues of the feminine exemplified by particular women rather 
than by any essential or homogeneous class character. 7 
The focus of the following essay will be on the popular invocation of 
feminine courts, female justices, and a separate and superior law originating 
from and administered by women under the feminine sign of fate or justice, 
fortune or phronesis. It will be argued that such texts form part of a largely 
forgotten tradition of constitutional writings which trace a feminine 
genealogy of common law, an origin and a telos of legal judgment, in a lost or 
future gynocratic polity. Such a genealogy traces the feminine within the 
constitution and commits itself to the dissipation of the palpably coercive 
unitary conception of common law: 
a return to the origins of our culture reveals that it was once otherwise, that there was an 
epoch when it was the woman who initiated the rites oflove. In that time, the woman was 
goddess and not servant, she guarded both the carnal and the spiritual dimensions of 
love. 8 
Prior to analysing three legal texts as evidence of this tradition, namely, John 
Fortescue's De Natura Legis Naturae (1466), John Selden's Jani Ang/orum 
Facies Altera (1610), and the anonymous Lawes Resolutions of Women's 
Rights (1632),9 a brief description of the classical background of this 
suppressed tradition is necessary. 
SOURCES OF LAW AND STATUSES OF WOMEN IN THE ANCIENT 
CONSTITUTION 
While it doubtless needs little emphasis, it is as well to begin by restating in 
some detail the diverse subordinate statuses of women within the various 
historical domains of common law. One dimension of such an analysis is the 
manner in which it illustrates forcefully the interdependence of the various 
laws governing the civil and ecclesiastical polity and still implicit, if frequently 
unrecognized, in contemporary law. At the level of structure or of what was 
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termed 'universal law', the civil position of women was dictated by their 
inferiority, their subordinate and accessory place in opposition or accession to 
men. The first source, historically and conceptually, is invariably the Corpus 
Juris, and there is little scope for feminist argument in the great Roman 
compilation. The Digest provides an extensive though scarcely cohereqt 
medley of prohibitions, incapacities, and denigrations of women as persons 
a/ieni iuris, subject to another's control. 10 General statements of principle are 
to be found in D.1.9.1 (Ulpian), 'greater dignity inheres in the male sex', and in 
D.1.5.9. (Papinian), 'there are many points in our law in which the condition 
of females is inferior to that_ of males (detior est condicio feminarum quarn 
masculorum)'. While it is not feasible to provide any comprehensive account of 
specific disabilities, the most obvious incapicities are comprehensively 
disabling. Most broadly, by D.50.17.2 (Ulpian): 
women are debatted from all civil and public functions and therefore cannot be judges or 
hold a magistracy or bring a lawsuit or intervene on behalf of anyone else or act as 
procurators. 
By D.16.1.1 it is reiterated that wotnen, like children, canttot perform any civil 
functions, they cannot undertake obligations and, by D.16.2.5, women are 
prohibited from acting as anyone's defertsor, concluding that 'a woman is not 
allowed to act in defence either of her husband, her son or her father.' The 
doctrinal logic underlying these and other incapacities stems from the obverse 
of women's inferior condition, namely the potestas or power of men. All 
authority in the family , including, in early Roman law, the power of life ;md 
death over children, lay with the male head of the family, the paterfamilias. 
The woman was, thus, either under the power of her own family or, aft~r 
marriage cum manu, would become the daughter of her husband (filiae loco). 
Finally, if an adult woman became independent on the death of her father or 
husband, she was forced into tutelage, into having a tutor assigned. 11 By 
D.1 .9.8 (Ulpian), husbands confer their dignity or status on their wives, while 
by the Institutes 1.11.10, 'women cannot adopt. They do not hold family 
authority even over their real children.' 
The positioning of women in permanent guardianship reflects an astringent 
scholastic view of feminine capability. Sex and disability are cognate with 
femininity, and it is reiterated throughout the law that women cannot perform 
the functions of men.12 Weakness, vulnerability, cunning and deception, 
frivolity, frailty, and shamelessness were by the time of the early Renaissance 
forensic commonplaces to be expanded, on the one hand, by reference to 
divine law and, on the other, by returning to the earlier scholastic sources of 
the patristic tradition. With the probably apocryphal exception of the 
daughter of Accursius, who is said by John Leslie to.have 'professed the Civil 
law openly', 13 neither the glossatorial nor the post-glossatorial tradition on 
the continent offered much by way of reform of the position of women. The 
strongly anti-feminist arguments of Jean Bodin's De Republica14 were 
influential in England and typical of humanist constitutional doctrine of the 
later reception. His refutation of gynocracy argued that it was 'absurd and 
inconvenient' 15 for women to govern, to which he adds finally that France, by 
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lucky virtue of the 'law Salique cuts the mother short and expressly forbids 
that a woman should by any means succeed into any fee'. 16 
Bodin's reference to Salic law was made in the context of a work which also 
stated that English common law was simply a borrowing from French local 
lllw. Ftam;ois Hotman, in his influential Frpnco-Gal/ia, also a~serted the 
primary role of the Salic exclusion of women but interestingly added a 
reference to Tac;itus to the effect that in Britain there was 'no distinction of 
sexes in Government' .17 Holman's general conclusion with regard to the state 
of French law stemmed from the civil law disability of women which was 
referred to 'their weakness of judgment'. In terms that would sound well in the 
language of common lawyers, Antoine Hatman authored a Traite de la Loy 
Sa/ique, which argued that the exclusion of women in France depended µpon 
antique custom, upon unwritten lllw, upon antiquity of the greatest weight 
and authority, 'as being of uncertain origin; more august and venerable for 
being collected out of inviolably guarded and uninterrupted usage.' 18 The 
exclusion could not be proved but could only be referred by conjecture to 'the 
most ancient memory ... et sunt haec arcana imperii [and these are the 
mysteries of government] which we would better reverence rather than 
research.' 19 It remained to be ijrgued that this immemorial French custom was 
of such age and validity as to be best considered as a part of nature 'honouring 
France above all other nations in the world'. 20 
In ecclesiastical, civil, and local law, the ambiguous place of women as the 
vehicles of biological and cultural transmission whose sex nevertheless 
overwhelmingly excluded them de iure from participation in political office, 
institutional function or real property right, was clearly a significant issue. It 
was recognized that all human beings passed through the maternity and 
tutelage of the gynaecium and yet, despite this crucial place and pedagogy of 
the feminine, civil law continued to deny it any direct association with the 
polity or public sphere. The continental debate within legal doctrine indicated 
both that women were a significant constitutional problem and that lawyers 
could not ignore wider theological and literary debates as to the place of 
women. Within French literary culture, the tradition of advocacy of feminine 
causes dated back to Christine de Pisan's La Cite des Femmes, a gynaetopia 
descriptive of an imaginary city universally sheltering women. Written in 
1404, The City of Ladies was translated into English in 1521 and joined a wider 
post-classical tradition of defences and laudatory works. 21 While the praise of 
illustrious women belonged to a classical literature stemming from Plutarch's 
De Mulierum Virtutibus, orators, educationalists, and ecclesiastics of the 
Renaissance and the Reformation saw the place, personality, and political role 
of women as a topic of immediate and threatening proportions. It was 
precisely because women were politically suspect and legally of uncertain 
status within the newly vernacularized jurisdictions across Europe that the 
querelle des femmes, the formulaic debate as to the place, social and natural 
status, education, and deportment of women emerged in law. 22 
The immediate doctrinal background to Fortescue's De Natura is to be 
found in the various unsystematic rules relating to the diverse legal capacities 
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and functions of women in Glanvill,' Bracton, and Fleta.23 The source of the 
rules was fairly uniformly that of Roman law, and the variations occasioned 
by medieval forms of homage, lordship and kingship were consonant with the · 
underlying structure of civil law. Thus, Glanvill states the law of English 
inheritance as being that: 
if anyone has a son and heir and also a daughter or daughters, the son succeeds to 
everything . . . the general rule (being] that a woman (mulier) never shares in an inheritance 
with a man. 24 
The most significant legal status of women was, of course, marriage and 
Glanvill states that 'legally a woman is completely in the power of her 
husband', a civilian rule which is elaborated in terms of the complete loss of 
the wife's power over any property, including present or future dower, with 
the sole partial exception of an inheritance acquired prior to marriage. All her 
property is otherwise deemed to be at the disposal of her husband for him 'to 
give, alienate or sell in whatever way he pleases ... and his wife is bound to 
consent to this as to all other acts of his which do not offend against God.' 2 5 
Glanvill further adopts Roman law in asserting that a married woman cannot 
make a will without her husband's consent, 26 and subsequently states that ifa 
woman or women are left as heirs of anyone they stay in ward of their lords 
and 'even if they are offull age ... they remain in ward (in custodia dominorum) 
until they are married on the Lord's advice and direction'. 27 
In Bracton, the first classification of persons, following Gaius, is between 
slave and free. 28 The second division of persons is between male, female, and 
hermaphrodite, to which it is added that 'women [feminae] differ in many 
respects from men, for their position is inferior to that ofmen'. 29 Bracton is 
dependent upon Roman law in his depiction of women and is even more direct 
in asserting the inferiority of their status. Women are not simply in the power 
of others, in the wardship or tutelage of lords: 'some are under the rod (sub 
virga ), as wives'. 3 0 In terms of property, Bracton coins an appropriately 
circular legal maxim - 'everything that is the wife's is the husband's' - for the 
traditional reason that the wife does not have potestatem. 31 While many of the 
more detailed rules relating to women, as that pertaining to women married to 
men attainted of felony or outlawed, have a local character, 32 the more 
general and exhaustive account of marital status and the incapacities that 
result from the woman's loss of will, remain, and are acknowledged as civilian. 
So too Bracton recognizes certain of the forms of protection that the civil law 
offers women. Gifts made to concubines are to be recognized as valid and a 
concubine may enfeoff her children. Gifts between husband and wife are 
invalid for fear of duress or beguilement or improper cause (alias causas) such 
as lust. 33 Nor may the husband commit fraud against 'the constitution of 
dower' by making gifts to strangers with a view to the stranger transferring the 
property to the wife during the husband's lifetime or after his death. 34 While 
the common law is developed from the civil, it was not always politic to 
recollect that descent and, in consequence, the status of women in municipal 
law could atleast on occasion be argued. 3 5 The legal context of Fortescue's De 
Natura Legis Naturae, the earliest text to be encountered in the common law 
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querelle des femmes, is undoubtedly that of Roman law and of continental 
custom. For all Fortescue's concern in De Laudibus Legum Angliae or in 
Governance of England to assert the historical priority and the national 
distinction of common law, both the method and the substantive content of 
those treatises are drawn closely from the European law.36 The context of the 
discussion is the law of succession and it is largely governed by civil and 
ecclesiastical rules. 3 7 
OF FATE, FORTUNE, JUSTICE, AND OTHER ILLUSTRIOUS 
WOMEN 
In the context of a legal structure so markedly geared to the restraint of female 
right, it seems remarkable that there was space at all for the assertion of 
contrary argument. Deprived of access to public office and defined most 
usually by the 'civil death' (civi/iter mortua) of marriage, namely, by the loss of 
will that accompanied the transfer of the daughter to the husband, the 
representation offeminine right was necessarily a polemical activity and closer 
in style to myth than to constitutional doctrine. The specific question debated 
in the two books of De Natura Legis Naturae is that of succession in supreme 
kingdoms: 
A King, acknowledging no superior in things temporal, has a daughter and a brother. The 
King dies without sons. The question is whether the Kingdom . . . descends to the 
daughter, the daughter's son, or the brother. 38 
A variety of answers are available to this question. By some local English law, 
it was possible that the daughter inherit, the law of gavelkind allowing 
succession to sons and daughters equally. 39 By Roman law, the inheritance 
would pass by the male line to the king's brother, while in ecclesiastical law, 
the same would hold with even more stringent prohibitions upon the 
possibility of feminine office. 
What is surprising about Fortescue's De Natura is that it devotes an entire 
work of two books to the question of women. Taking the form of a dialogue 
and latterly, in the second book, of a mock trial, the issue initially is that of 
what law is to govern the debate. The resolution to this question is more 
complex than is immediately apparent. All vernacular law claims antique or 
immemorial status, as also it claims the benefaction of divine decree. Just as 
Antoine Hotman depicted Salic law as customary practice so old as to be the 
uncorrupted law of nature expressive of a pristine sacred will, 40 so Fortescue 
depicts English custom as prior to and necesarily consonant with the divine 
law as well as the law of nature and nations. The question of which legal forum 
and which law is to decide the issue offeminine sovereignty raises questions of 
theology, nature, and positive law, of written and unwritten prescription, of 
regal and political dominion. No one law can resolve an issue as fundamental 
as that of the constitution and being of woman but, rather, one law must be 
folded into another according to the sacred hierarchy of normative orders, 'for 
the Civil Laws say that the offspring is a portion of the mother's entrails'.41 
281 
© Basil Blackwell Ltd . 1993 
The order of law begins with man's abandonment of original justice and 
state of grace. This means that the origin of law is unknowable: its past 
presence cap no longer be recollected, it cannot be other than the immemorial 
and inconstant representation, simulacrum or vestigium of a pre-lapsarian 
state. It is termed divine providence, fate, law or will, and it is the mother of 
patural law: 'Law of Nature is daughter of Divine law'.42 This Christian amor 
matrfs or love of ap ineffable mother, of incertitude as the feminine source of 
the descent of all law, is expressed more directly in the figure of justice herself. 
The maternal line which runs from divine law to natural law, the feminine 
thread upon which both laws precariously hang, is justice depicted first as 
truth: ' the truth of justice (iustitiae veritas), which is capable of being revealed 
by right reason', is the law of Nature. Secondly, however, the truth of justice is 
termed Phronesis 'and is comely of face and lovely of aspect'. 43 The feminine 
face or decor of justice is no accident. 44 In one genealogy of the iconography 
of justice, the fates are daughters of the Parcae who are in turn the daughters 
of necessity. Dike is similarly a feminine God.45 Fortescue provides a literal 
expression of this iconography or imagery in ipdjcating at the beginning of the 
second book that 'justice is also a judge', she who assigns to everyone her right, 
for a judge is so named from pronoµncing judgment 'and she pronounces 
judgment, since, as the laws say generally judgment is given by her; she is 
indeed herself the judge of all human actions'.46 
One possible interpretation ofFortescue's use offeminine imagery is simply 
to deny that it has any political or legal significance: it is, like rhetoric and like 
art or plastic representation, merely decorative or accidental. The femininity 
of justice is simply its materiality, its contingency and not its essence: it is as it 
is represented for the reason that its representation is no more than a reminder 
or ephemeral sign of its cause. Surprisingly, Fortescue argues directly to this 
effect: 
Nor is it any obstacle to her power that women are by law excluded from the judicial office; 
for although the word justice be of the feminine gender, she herself is not a woman nor of 
the female sex; for sex hath no place in virtues any more than in spirits.4 7 
While this statement might appear to deny the expression of any feminine 
cause or sentiment in the actual representation of judgment, it is nonetheless 
the case that the femininity of the image, of the material presence and person 
of positive law and of its insular forms does at least institute certain anomalies 
and suggest separate orders and genders of the common law. Like Janus, the 
common law has at least two faces. Like the widow's memory of her husband 
depicted in the Ladies Calling, legal retrospection multiplies the images of the 
past. 4s 
The civil law dictates that the law (ius) takes its name from justice (justitia). 
This derivation of the name oflaw instructs the lawyer through a grammatical 
method which 'makes known to us some natures both of laws and other 
virtues by force of etymologies'. 49 That ius takes its name from Justitia obliges 
Fortescue to conjecture that: 
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from the same it hath derived the origin of its generation, and is thus entitled to 1:,e 
distinguished by the name of its parent ... but as the lustre from the light, the heat frciril the 
fire, the gushing stream from its spring, so doth the law of nature come from justice .. . 
justice begets law. so 
The generation of natural law, of'Dame Nature' as source oflaw, involves a 
complex principle of inner lineage, a principle of ruin or of relics. The 
femininity of justice is not only the re(Sresentation of a material and so 
contingent form of judgment, justice is memory as reminiscence and as 
legitimacy, the memory of generation, of maternity, of the certitude of the cinly 
begetting to the only begotten. Justice survives in the temporal law by means 
of vestiges and similitudes. Justice is a temporal yet internal image (ymaginem) 
which triggers recollection of who we are by virtue of reminding us whence we 
came. The femininity of justice is the cunning of memory as reminiscence, as 
the mirror of the plurality of experience; it is the reitscin of likeness, the 
ultimate law which Fortescue admits can never produce a true image or pure 
visibility for: 
ofcreatures there be no true likenesses whereby the creature may be truly assimilated to its 
Creator, no mo're than the shadow to the body, the footprint to the foot, or the image to 
the real thirig, yet ih all things some likeness is discovered to their creators. 5 1 
The paradox whtch confronts the common law - 'our Lady the common 
law' - is thus resident irt the dual nature of the image and the two faces of 
justice. The image is both memory and the recollection or relic (footprint) of 
divine reasori . It is the deceptive form of experience; the fragile symptom or 
sign of accident, and yet it is also the vehicle or bearer of esserice, it is ihe 
footprint of God (Dei vestigia) and so, too, the only surviving sign of the 
generation of law. And justice itself is paradoxically a wt>man. It is not a 
woman in terms of Christiari or natural law esserice, because neither spirit nor 
soul have a sex; the truth is precisely the proper form of the incorporeal. 
Justice is as a woman because even the law has a body, and it is in bodies that 
sex exists (in corporibus est sexum). It is feminine because ifit is a question of 
the application of law, a question of experience and judgement; of likenesses 
and their material inscriptions, then justice requires that the law acknowledge 
the ethical and contingent logic, the fluidity, of the event. Fortescue ~dmits 
such.contingency as doe face of the common law but denies that such feniinine 
attributes are ever anything other than secondary to the speculative logic of 
law. He admits the figure of woman as an accident in the development of 
common law and as a symbol that purveys a likeness oflaw but not its essence, 
which is God. To adopt even a very simplified psychoanalytic reading of 
Fortescue's denial of the significance of the female form of justice, it would 
have' to be said that the denial, or, more properly, the neg&tiori, precisely 
confirms that the plural figure of woman is inseparable from that of law. 
The general tenor of the argument pursued in the second book of De Natura 
is uril:emarkable. The King's daughter argues from divine law and specifically 
from the judgment of Moses in the case of the daughters of Zefophehad who 
were allowed to inherit the natne and estates of their father. 52 SHe fu~ther 
offers a summary genealogy offemale rule, of noble and erudite women whose 
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antiquity coincides with natural law·and whose role in the history of England 
constitutes a precedent: 'did the law which permitted so many women to reign 
ever exclude me therefrom?' 53 On the other side, it is argued that the law 
should distinguish the right of succession to kingdoms from the right of 
succession to private estates. Nature subjects the female sex (muliebri sexuz) to 
the male in both social and domestic circumstance, while the civil law reflects 
this subjection by excluding women from public office. More than that, the 
querel/e is invoked to specify, with unnecessary or at least non-probative 
detail, female characteristics of simplicity, subservience, physical inferiority, 
lesser virtue, deformity, irrationality, slenderness of understanding, lack of 
heat, deficiency of construction, heedlessness, timidity, fear of death, and the 
proclivity to domesticity (yconomia). 54 
The replications and the duplications conform, in detail and in range of 
argument, to the broader querelle des femmes. What is exceptional is the scope 
oflegal sources drawn upon to substantiate the disassociation of the feminine 
imagery and grammatical gender of nature, justice, virtue, and law, from the 
dignity or public or civil office of women. Standard arguments from the name 
(virago is a diminutive of vir); from creation (man was created first); from 
original sin (Eve was first tempted); and divine judgement (God sentenced Eve 
to bring forth children in sorrow, and to be in the power of her husband) are all 
adduced to support the morality of both laws, civil and canon, in relation to 
women. The only further point that bears brief description is that from the 
notion of 'ymago Dei' . It is man who is made in the image of God and after his 
likeness, for the Bible states: 'faciamus hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem 
nostram.' The canon law reiterates that woman was not made in the image of 
God and adds that 'the woman veils her head, because she is not the image of 
God. 5 5 It would be against fate, against the nature of things and 'contrary to 
the principle of Being (non esse de ratione entis)' 56 to grant women the right of 
succession. Both Jaws encapsulate and formulate as rules the previously 
existing and divinely ordained disability of women. 
The duplication of the daughter reverses the assumptions of the repli-
cations. It is the form of the querelle to contradict in polemical fashion and the 
daughter does not disappoint. Suffice it to relate that her argument hinges on a 
history or antiquity which is older than that presented by the male litigants. If 
divine judgment punished feminine sin by subordinating women to their 
husbands, then logically and historically, women were orginally - and so by 
nature and inclination - free of subordination. In the law of Nature, the male 
argument is void: subjugation was a penalty and not a property of feminine 
being. Secondly, subordination was the sentence of married women only. It 
would be profane and against all principles of penal law to extend the 
punishment to unmarried women. 5 7 
The judgment itself is taken directly from patristic texts, specifically from 
Augustine's Civitate Dei, and asserts an ordained or providential ontological 
order iri which the original disposition of priorities or prelacies favoured the 
male and subordinated the female sex. The woman ought to be subject to the 
man, 'as the flesh to the spirit . .. the pre-eminence of the man over the woman 
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seems to be [comparable] to the pre-eminence of the reasoning faculties over 
sensual appetites, or of the soul over the body'. 58 Neither history nor counter-
example nor evidence of feminine virtue could in any way transmute or by 
length of time prescribe a woman's right to office. The inferiority of women 
within the hierarchy of'proper nature' was a facet of the originary, of the state 
of innocence, and so an incontestable law of nature coincident with the spirit 
which preceded the generation of the sexes. What is established as a principle 
of being or asserted as providence or fate is not amenable to change any more 
than immemorial custom, practice time-out-of-mind or any other of the 
'rubbish of antiquity' could fall either by reason or by desuetude from the 
common law. 
JANUS OR THE OTHER FACE OF ENGLISH LAW 
The immediate subsequent history of the question of feminine status at 
common law tended to revolve around specific issues and did not directly rely 
upon any genuine re-opening of the querelle des femmes. The place of women 
was mapped and the Janus face of common law was turned elsewhere. What is 
surprising is that the place of women is raised as an issue at all, let alone that 
subsequent constitutional texts should advocate their independence. Thus, for 
John Perkins, A Profitable Book Treating of the Lawes of England, first 
published in 1532, women are not a legal category but rather a series of 
statuses spelled out in relation to specific property rights and transactions. 
Thus, the married woman is compared to the monk, friar, servant or canon as 
one without right and incapable of either livery or seisin. 59 A grant made by a 
feme covert during the absence of her husband, 'notwithstanding the husband 
were abroad or out of the country, wandering at the time of such grant ... so 
that it was not known whether he were alive or dead, yet such grant is void ifhe 
be living.'60 Nor can the wife make a testament in the absence or without the 
consent of the husband. The rules may be multiplied and, on occasion, Courts 
of Equity would recognize certain rights in the wife who would be treated for 
such purposes under the fiction that she were afeme sole, for example, with 
respect to property granted specifically for her separate use or with regard to 
certain devices used by the husband to enfeoffthe wife. 61 In conceptual terms, 
Sir Thomas Smith in the influential De Republica Anglorum simply reasserts 
the Aristotelian limitations upon the role of women and adds by way of 
flourish that the civil law on the issue of succession should govern in England, 
'on which consideration also we do reject women' .62 Yet, neither in Rastell's 
The Exposicions of the Termes of the Lawes of Eng/ande, nor for that matter in 
Cowell's The Interpreter, is woman - either mu/ier or feme or foemina - an 
entry in its own right. 63 It is tempting to think that as suddenly as it appeared 
at common law, the category of women would seem to have disappeared in the 
literature of abridgments, form books, entries, breviaries, and rolls that made 
as yet no attempt at systematic or conceptual classification. Women, however, 
remained a problem at a conceptual and constitutional level. 
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Confusion of orders and genders is, in many respects, the signal theme of 
Jani Ang/orum Facies Altera, 64 a work which is explicitly dedicated to 'the 
Reverse or Back Face of the English Janus', 65 which means the stories, 
fictions, and legends of common law, 'which I offer up in sacrifice ... these 
scraps and fragments of collection, relating entirely, what they are, and as far 
as the present age may be supposed to be concerned in ancient stories and 
customs'. 66 The two faces (facieque biformi) of English law, 'for thou canst 
hardly choose but own him having two faces' ,67 are variously British and 
Norman, pre- and post-conquest, native and foreign, saturnine and mercurial, 
antique and contemporary, before and behind, and, finally, both male and 
female. It is a law which is marked, in other words, like Janus, by ambiguity 
and a certairi 1ndistinction. Where Janus was the god of doors and gates and 
presided over the beginning or origin of things, the Janus of English law 
similarly guarded the origin or entry into law, the indistinct, pre-institutional, 
and indefinite time of customary or unwritten law. Its history, Selden argues, is 
not only two-faced but also marred by neglect, by lack of regard and 'the 
injury of time' such that its past and its records ai:e as close to myth as to 
historical narrative. From the , remains of record and history, Selden 
endeavours to describe the legal constitution of 'Pananglium, that is, All 
England',68 a realtn that in one view, that ofMarcianus, has in it thirty three 
nations.69 And behind the legends of origin and of source of common law, 
behind the narratives of its diverse temporal beginnings, the representation or 
image of common law, its symbolic descent, is consistently portrayed as being 
from a variety of feminine images and female figures, the forgotten faces of a 
law which was never one. 
The metaphor of prosographia, used by Fortescue and others, of a feminine 
face of justice returns most forcefully in Selden. To represent the backface oi: 
underside of the constitution, the institutional unconscious, myth or image, 
leads to a return to the legal querelle des femmes. It leads in particular to a 
tabulation of famous or illustrious women legislators, lawgivers, and 
sovereigns from antiquity to contemporaneity. In the time of the laws, old 
heroes went by the names of gods and in the qruidical Celtic colony of Britain, 
the semnaitheia or 'venerable Goddesses' ruled. These were the goddesses of 
justice, the Furies, 'also called Themis', who sat 'upon the skirts of the wicked' 
and; as (by antiphrasis) the Eumenides, rewarded the good and 'such as are 
blameless and faultless'. 70 They are the first judges of the Celtic common law, 
the_ deis matribus or mother goddesses to whom altars were inscribed and 
before whose dreadful justice the populace would tremble and shake. To this 
description Selden adds: 'Nor let it be any hindrance, that so splendid and so 
manly a naine is taken from the weaker sex, to wit, the Goddesses.' 71 It is in 
hon6ur of these goddesses of the night that the terms of the Jaw and, indeed, 
the divisions of the calendar - 'the spaces or intervals of all time' - are defined 
not by the number of days, but that of nights. 7 2 
Asto the historical face of the common law, it was frequently female. While 
Selden admits a certain 'poetick licerice arid rhetorical figure' to the pre-
Roman stories, his own account, which starts with the druids, the severe and 
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melancholic figures reported by Caesar, Strabo, and Tacitus, is even more 
explicitly feministic. Taking the side of Tacitus, who reported that the 
Germanic tribes held their women in almost mystical awe, Selden savages the 
anti-feminine sentiments of Bodin, of the Salic lawyers, and of Aristotle 
himself. Women in Britain participated in councils of war and in military 
duties, indeed 'Britons were want to war under the conduct of women, and to 
make no difference of sexes in places of government and command'. 7 3 In one 
aspect, the argument is specific to Britain and to the regency of English queens, 
particularly those most illustrious of monarchs, Boadicea and Elizabeth. 
Women monarchs had often been the most successful and as Serjeant 
Lodowick Lloyd, in an equally feministic passage, argued slightly earlier, 'if 
men govern like women, then women should govern'. 74 
Selden's view was both that women had governed and that they should 
govern. In terms of the various pasts which Selden depicts, all are witness to 
feminine rule. In mythology there were 'more She-Gods than He-Gods', while 
'virtue herself ... is female in dress (cu/tu) and in name'. 75 Indeed, Selden 
states that 'I will not declaim female excellency here: the thing speaks for itself 
more than I can, and the subject is its own best orator'. What follows this 
rhetorical gesture is a denuncil\ltion ofBodin's De Republica and an even more 
polemical assertion that Aristotle would admit women to government 
'whatever the foolish interpreters of the Politics say'. 76 Such an argument is a 
commonplace drawn fairly directly from the antinomic or polarized form of 
the querelle des femmes. 77 There can be no natural law prohibiting women 
from government because historical counter-examples indicate that male rule, 
far from being universal and unchanging, is quite frequently the historical 
exception. Against Bodin, Selden thus lists the instances of matriarchy at the 
level both of cultures - such as Egypt - and at that of individual monarchs -
such as Deborah or Artemis. 7 8 At an ontological level, he aligns women to the 
other face of reason, to the virtues of 'sanctity and foresight ', on the strength 
of which the arguments against women can only be taken for 'mad rude 
expressions ... not unfit for a professor in Bedlam College ... Virtue shuts no 
door against anybody, any sex, but freely admits all'. 79 
In one aspect, Selden's argument is that femininity is the other face of law, 
which he links directly to mythology, to fragmentary records, to a feminine 
imaginary and its figures of virtue. Elsewhere, in a study of the genealogy of 
the gods, Selden depicts the plastic symbolism of justice in terms of a left-
handed goddess; blind and beautiful, pure and untouched: she was nature in 
culture, wisdom in law. 80 The metaphor (prosopopoeia) of another face of law 
may indeed be taken in many different senses. By analogy with Janus, the 
female face of law is the face that looks back, that remembers both the 
historical succession of feminine rulers but also, and more profoundly, the 
experience or generation of habits and customs. To understand custom one 
must look at law, but that law is never simply one. The law of custom is 'other' 
to law or, more accurately, it is an other law in that it is in and through custom 
that laws are 'discovered' or 'found' or 'declared' or otherwise born. 
Femininity would here be the hidden face of tradition and women would be 
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both the custodians of the unwritten and the symbols of its transmission. 
Here, in the iconography of justice, lustitia would be blindfolded so as to 
indicate that she looked with the eyes of the heart. 
In another sense, the foresight which Selden attributes to femininity is a sign 
of the transcendental quality oflegality itself. Foresight is connotative also of 
soothsaying and divining, of the powers of the divine which belong either 
within or without the law dependent upon the tasks or the purposes to which 
these powers are put. 81 In a book on witchcraft addressed to Sir Edward Coke 
and published in the same year as Jani Anglorum, the theologian William 
Perkins ascribes an extraordinary power and materiality to the feminine 
principle at work in witchcraft. For Perkins, the power of the feminine is 
evident in the reality of their creations: 
that witches may and do work wonders, is evidently proved ... and the wonders wrought 
by them are not properly and simply miracles, but works of wonder, because they exceed 
the ordinary powers and capacity of men, especially such as are ignorant of Satan's 
hability, and the hidden causes in nature, whereby things are brought to pass. 82 
The works of the feminine witch are not damnable for being unreal - 'they 
were works truly done and effected' - but for being unfaithful, immoral or in 
the service of other laws. Works of wonder, of divination and soothsaying, are 
deceitful only by virtue of the 'evil end and purpose in working them, which is 
to lie unto men' as to the hidden nature of their causes. 83 A law which 
borrowed substantially from the Anglican conception of a dual polity could 
not avoid at least confronting the power of such feminine reason, either so as 
to confirm or so as to banish its art and practice. For, in the end, the principle 
of reason upon which law was founded was neither male nor female. It has a 
sex only in its embodiment, in its materialization, in the intuition, discrim-
ination, memory or choice through which it becomes law for us. The reason of 
judgment, of the application oflaw, is deemed the law of the second Venus, the 
copulation of norm and fact, general and particular, rule and circumstance. 84 
WOMEN'S LAW 
In concluding his argument as to the right of women to govern, Selden stated 
'nor could I forbear out of conscience with my suffrage, to assist as far as I 
could, that sex, which is so great and comfortable an importance to 
mankind'. 85 Here and elsewhere in Jani Anglorum Selden had challenged 
aspects of the Renaissance interpretation of Aristotle and in this regard he 
builds upon a political tradition that saw Elizabeth's sovereignty as an 
occasion to reassert the argument for feminine office and rule. John Case, in the 
Sphaera Civitatis (1588) had attacked the assumption that the domestic duties 
and subjugation of women should be interpreted as extending to the public 
sphere: 
Experience makes her wise. What, therefore, prevents women from playing a full part in 
public affairs? If one is born free , why should she obey? If one is heiress to a kingdom, why 
should she not reign?86 
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At one level this argument simply recognizes female regency as historical 
reality and suggests that constitutional doctrine recognize this accomplished 
fact. More interesting, however, than the political assertion of a challenge to 
scholasticism is the desire to develop and interpret this argument on the 
strength not of the classics but of common law. Thus, in debating the more 
complex issue of Mary Queen of Scots, it is John Knox, attacking the 
'monstriferous empire', the enormity, vanity, odour, and 'pestiferous policies' 
of this idol, this 'cursed Jezebel' , who relies wholly upon Roman law and 
patristic interpretations. 8 7 The apologists for women tum to the vernacular 
English jurisdiction and the maternal common law. 
Bishop Aylmer's response to Knox argues: 
that this matter belongs not to the civil law, but to the municipal law of England, for like as 
every field brings forth not all fruits: so is not ~ne law mete for all countries. I grant that the 
civil law is the best, the perfectest and the largest, that ever was made: yet comprehends it 
not all things in all countries ... wherefore in appointing us to be ordered by civil law you 
offend in iustitia distributiva ... our law must direct us, because it best agrees with our 
coun.try.88 
Civil law would smother England and extinguish those customary rules that 
were the distinctive inheritance of common law, its ancient stories which 'be 
the witness of time, the candle of truth, the life of memory ... and the register 
of antiquity'. 89 The civil law, in its universality and abstraction, in its size and · 
its strength, would destroy the feminine virtues of the local and particular 
experience of common law. Like a woman, the common law is inessential and 
particular when compared to its parent or its continental competitor; it has 
either to mimic the stronger and prior law or differentiate itself by defining 
itself against it. But whichever is the case, the memory of the rule of the parent 
civil law is traumatic for a common law which seeks its own identity through 
separation and polemic. For Aylmer, it is thus our 'own weights' that should 
weigh in the scales of justice and by those measures women are to be more 
liberally treated and their ryght to succession and office allowed. 
Even more striking for its assertion of the vernacular law is the work of John 
Leslie in defence of Mary Queen of Scots' claim to the English Crown. Neither 
civil law nor Salic law have any place in England where the law is unwritten 
and 'grounded onlie upon a common and generall custome throughe owte the 
whole realme ... as apperethe by the treatise of the aunciente and famous 
writter upon the lawes of the realme named Ranulphus de Glanvilla.'90 
Leslie's account of the law ostensibly builds upon a detailed knowledge of 
uniquely English rules. The question of succession, concerning as it does the 
royal prerogative and powers, must be decided by rules that uniquely govern 
the sovereign. To this effect, he cites the 'maxime oflawe' that 'no maxime or 
rule in the lawe can extende to binde the kinge or crowne, unless the same be 
speciallie mentioned therein'. 91 On the strength of this principle of inter-
pretation, Leslie admonishes those who had taken legislation of 1350, An Act 
Touching such as be born beyond the Seas, as applying to the Crown, which was 
not specifically named. The legislation was taken, though only by implication, 
to deny the right of inheritance in England to those who were born out of 
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England, out of the 'ligeance of the King' and whose parents were not 'of the 
obedience of the Kinge ofEnglande'.92 To apply such law to the Crown not 
only ignored the principles of statutory interpretation but also ignored 
constitutional history and the law on strangers recollected from English case 
law whose records no longer survive. 
The distinction and idiosyncracy of English law is a theme common to 
Aylmer and to Leslie. It is thus argued comprehensively that 'by custom in 
England all manner of ... jurisdictions and other prerogatives [are], and ought 
to be, as fully and wholly and absolutely in the Prince female as in the male, 
and so was it ever deemed, judged and accepted' . 93 It is upon the particular 
character and quality of such arguments that attention should be focused. 
Subsequent texts which argue for female rights or simply attempt to protect or 
defend the status or the interests of women are most striking where they attach 
such concern to substantive legal issues. On the one hand, there are texts such 
as Heale, An Apologiefor Women (1609), which endeavour to argue for change 
in the law on the basis of theological and moral prescriptions. The sole topic of 
the Apo/ogie is the question whether the husband has a legal right to beat his 
wife: In analysing the civil law - which governs all aspects of spousals and 
marriage - Heale finds many rulesthat are archaic, ignorant or simply morally 
. objectionable. The catalogue of laws in need of reform includes the 
dependence of the wife on the husband in terms of dignity (she takes his name 
and status) and the duty of the wife to follow the husband from city to city or 
even abroad. It includes the 'strict and obdurate' rule that the wife loses her 
dowry for giving a 'lascivious kiss' and equally remarks the inequality that 
allows the husband to commit adultery but holds that if the wife 'play the 
Adulteresse ... the husband may then produce her into publike judgment, 
deprive her of .her promised dowrie and expose her to perpetual divorce-
ment'. ll 4 Nowhere, however, in civil or canon law canHeale find any 'positive 
sentence or verdict that it is lawful for a husband to beat his wife'. 95 It is pure 
interpretation based upon the invective of 'mysogynaes' and 'cynickes' who 
have either the hate or the ignorance necessary to bend the law and to suggest 
that so indecorous, immoral, and ill-mannered · a custom could possibly be 
English law. If it is, however, to be taken as law, then there is nothing to say 
that the wife is legally bound to endure or tolerate such beating. She may leave 
her husband and the husband must pay her an adequate maintenance during 
her absence. 96 
Heale argues by extensive analogy and by reason of consistency. While his 
work certainly has its share of arguments drawn from the querelle - he praises 
famous women, he adopts the theological argument that Eve was made of 
man, but man was made of earth ('man by a strange kind of metamorphosis 
[was] converted into woman'97 ) - but the primary force of the argument is 
pragmatic and legalistic and does not go further than suggesting that male and 
female are equal in their qualities as in their failings. It is, for Heale, ultimately 
a constitutional question and so a question of manners, decency, and decorum 
in the estate of husband and wife. As decorum is the end or goal of the 
Anglican commonwealth, it is the task of the lawyer: 
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as a laborious traveller [to go] through all estates, to bring all unto decency. He ordcreth 
the estate of monarchs and princes; of peers and nobles; of magistrates and subjects; of 
parents and children; of husbands and wives; of masters and servants . .. so that an 
absolute indecorum is an absolute breach of the law.9 8 
Such a view may well seem to come close to the heart of the unwritten 
tradition: what is against the judicial perception of good manners or is 'not 
without vice' is unlawful of itself as being contra bonos mores, indelicate, odd 
or extreme. 
The evidence of the Repertorium Canonicum and other abridgments and 
treatises would seem to suggest that in some areas doctrine does change to the 
end of greater protection of the separate rights of women. The rights or 
interests protected vary over time and are normally attendant upon or 
secondary to male interests. Nonetheless, fictions are developed to allow the 
husband to endow the wife;99 the issue of duress in marriage is canvassed in 
relation to gifts and wills made by the wife either to the husband or to strangers 
to the marriage; 100 the wife is allowed a plea of non est Jae tum in relation to 
debts; 101 the interest of the unmarried woman in her own reputation is 
protected rigorously by laws of defamation; 102 there is legislation on rape and 
the carrying away of unmarried women with property; 103 the law governing 
separation and rights of alimony is further elaborated, 104 as are other rules 
designed to maintain the reputation and decorum of the feminine. Decorum, 
however, while it may be the oldest of legal criteria is hardly the most definite 
nor necessarily the most accessible. 
The greatest legal monument of the querelle is not Heale's defence nor 
Selden's poetic histories but, rather, a legal manual in the style of a work of 
self-help called The Lawes Resolutions of Women 's Rights, anonymously 
published in 1632.105 While the popularization of legal knowledge was a 
dimension of the vernacularization which accompanied print, and many law 
dictionaries, books of precedents, and treatises were prefaced with remarks to 
the effect that every subject of the realm could now know the law, 106 a book 
devoted to women's law and subtitled the Woman 's Lawyer is a remarkable 
event. What could 'woman's law' be if the law knew no such category? The 
answer is that, for the purposes of this new legal discipline, the author of the 
Woman's Lawyer replaces the first division of the law of persons - that 
between slave and free-with a 'a primary distribution' between masculine and 
feminine, for masculum etfoeminamfecit eos. 107 Yet the category of woman 
includes no single designation or definition but rather lists every transaction in 
which femininity- the various categories offeme, mu/ier,foemina, dowager, 
concubine, virgin or ward - was an element. 
The purpose of the treatise is twofold. It is first designed simply to extract 
from common law sources - from statutes, conjoining customs, cases, 
opinions, sayings, arguments, judgments, and points oflearning- that part of 
English law 'belonging to women' , or which 'contains the immunities, 
advantages, interests and duties of women' .108 In this respect, the work is 
ostensibly addressed generically to the illusory referent 'women' and is 
designed to provide information 'with as little tediousness as I can' 109 which 
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was not otherwise readily available. In this sense, the work is an exhaustive 
catalogue of points oflaw that mention, touch or affect the different categories, 
statuses or faces of the feminine. Such popular intent, however, has deeper 
roots, for as Selden found in Jani Anglorum, it is not possible to write a 
constitutional history, let alone list the laws that govern a majority of legal 
subjects without becoming aware ofthe ambiguity or the ethical inconsistency 
of the tradition. To compile an extended account of the law touching women 
was to produce a document enfolded in several jurisdictions or laws and of 
itself a record of peculiar cultural and political significance. The constant 
theme of the advice offered throughout the treatise was that of the defence of 
women, the critique of common law, and the manipulation of hostile rules to 
the benefit of an oppressed class. 
Wherever the law could be ameliorated or its application tempered by 
foresight of feminine need, then the Woman's Lawyer offered the means of 
such fiction or improvement. Heale's example of the lawful right of the 
husband to beat his wife is confirmed, according to our author, by Brooke's 
Abridgement, which states that 'ifa man beat an outlaw, a traitor, a pagan, his 
villein, or his wife it is dispunishable, because by the law common these 
persons can have no action.'110 The reason at law for this disability is both 
specific, in the form of the precedent cited, and a consequence of the general 
status of the wife as sub potestate viri, and so without independent legal 
personality for most though not all purposes. There is thus no obvious legal 
solution to the problems of the woman whose husband is violent, either in 
precedent or in doctrine. The Woman's Lawyer, however, does not limit itself 
to remarking the woman's bad choice of company. A writ listed by Fitzherbert 
is cited which states that: 
she may sue out of Chancery to compell him to find surety of honest behaviour toward her, 
and that he shall neither do nor procure to be done to her (marke I pray you) any bodily 
damage, otherwise than appertains to the office of husband or lawful and reasonable 
correction. 1 1 1 
The English Janus gave with one hand what it took away with the other. The 
Woman 's Lawyer remarks that the scope of this power of correction is 
uncertain yet continues to observe that: 
the sex feminine is at no very great disadvantage ... why may not the wife beat the husband 
... what action can he have if she do ... the actionless woman beaten by her husband, hath 
retaliation left to beat him again, if she dares. 11 2 
The discussion of 'lawfulness' is concluded by remarking that if the husband 
come to Chancery to compel surety he is unlikely to be heard. While this may 
well have been good law, it is hard to imagine that it was good or feasible 
practice in a legal context in which a wife who killed her husband was guilty of 
the felony of treason, albeit petty treason against the prerogative of the 
husband. 113 
The advice offered in the above example would appear to be in part ironic, 
yet the fact that every section of the work contains similar advice for the 
woman suggests that in that instance it was more likely despair than flippancy 
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that motivated the sentence. In other segments of the treatise the advice is of 
obvious purport and the suggestion of fictions would genuinely change the 
law. Different transactions, relationships, and threats create different 
problems for the female 'persona' in law and the Woman 's Lawyer attempts no 
one solution or form of exchange for distinctive situations. Thus, one chapter 
of the treatise is devoted to the law on loss of dower, the wife's entitlement in 
law should the husband die before her: ' the rest of the fourth book shall consist 
most in warnings to widows and women tenants in particular estates, that they 
do nothing prejudicial to their warrant', namely to the writ of quod ei deforciat 
which allows a widow to recover dower.114 The subsequent chapter lists the 
various ways in which a widow might lose dower, as by allowing buildings or 
woods to fall to waste and so threatening the interest of the reversioner; if she 
alienated or made a gift of lands held in dower, the heir could recover. In 
broader terms, the advice on dower is not only cautionary but hortative. The 
Woman 's Lawyer remarks that divorce and widowhood should in many 
respects be welcomed: 'Why mourn you so? Consider how long you have been 
in subjection under the predominance of parents, of your husbands, now you 
be free in liberty, and free proprii iuris at your own law' and under the power or 
'controlment' of no man. 11 5 
In respect of other transactions, the woman may or may not retain legal 
personality according to specific rules. In some instances, the advice is trivial 
or humorous. The widow who takes more apparel than is convenient for her 
degree is made an executrix de son tort demesne, which is 'a troublesome 
office' . 116 A wife only becomes entitled to dower upon consummation of the 
marriage and so is advised to leave the wedding party early 'and leave out the 
long measurles till you be in bed . .. get you there quickly, and pay the 
minstrels tomorrow.' 11 7 More serious advice pertains to the presumption of 
duress in relation to contracts between husband and wife, the possibility of 
employing fictions to enfeoff the wife, and the circumstances under which the 
crimes of the husband will be visited upon the wife, as when she loses her 
dower if her husband is outlawed or attainted of felony. 11 8 The status of the 
married woman is that of infant: she loses her property, is incapable of making 
contracts, cannot sue or bring a writ in her own right and can neither inherit by 
nor make a will. At the same time, 'in matters of criminal and capital causes, a 
feme covert shall answer without her husband' unless the crime was committed 
with the husband or by coercion of the husband, in which case the wife cannot 
be charged.11 9 
The disabilities and incapacities as well as the rights of women are specific to 
·occasions and transactions. The Woman 's Lawyer attempts to situate 
particular legal relations with regard to their impact upon the female sex. The 
closest that the work comes to a general account or critique of the law 
governing women is in relation to the inequality of legal provision in 
circumstances where difference of sex - however defined - would not appear 
determinative. Thus the law governing elopement, whereby a woman forfeits 
her dower for adultery but the husband is immune, and is allowed any number 
of adulterous relationships without forfeiture of land. Redress for this 
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inequality should be 'by Parliament' and in the meantime there was the 
Christian solace of knowing that 'liberty or impunity in doing evil by 
immodest life or lascivious gallops, is no freedom or happiness'. 120 In 
suggesting reforms of the law or in berating aspects of specific legal conditions 
such as the loss of noble status in a woman who marries below her degree, it is 
not so much the unity 'woman' as the fragmentary condition which is the 
object of critique. The feminine sex oflegal subjects should not be 'abstruded', 
smothered, concealed or 'scattered in corners of an uncouth language', but, at 
the same time, the Woman's Lawyer does not treat that sex in an undiffer-
entiated way. 121 Thus, to take one final example, the Woman's Lawyer begins 
not by defining the classification of all persons into male or female, but, rather, 
by listing the seven ages that the woman has for legal purposes. The different 
legal states of femininity, as maiden, wife, widow, are cross-cut by virginity 
and maternity, but also by age, as, for example: 'woman is out of ward for her 
body [that is, she can marry] before she is out of ward for her land'. 122 If she 
marries a man under age she remains in her father's ward. She may have dower 
at the age of nine, at twelve she may consent to marriage, at fourteen she may 
choose a guardian. 123 
GYNAETOPIA OR THE LEGAL PLACE OF THE FEMININE 
The most strikingly contemporary feature of the Woman's Lawyer and, more 
generally, of feminine genealogies of law is the uncertainty of the category of 
women within early legal thought. In Selden's terms, the feminine was both the 
other face and the particularity of common law. At one level, this ambiguity 
forced law to mix with other literatures and to search the languages of 
theology, nature, philosophy, medicine, politics, ethics, and the other occult 
sciences to find some way of characterizing an essentially inessential being. 
The feminine, however, escaped delimitation: it was both fecund and fluid, 
both image and flesh, ignorant and erudite, illustrious and idolatrous, both 
Iustitia and Jezebel, matter and wonder. This sex which was not one, which 
was lost or 'clean abstruded' in the law was never successfully defined in 
advance as the querelle des femmes would have intended. Women were not a 
predicate oflaw but rather impermanent subjects oflegal judgment. A woman 
was an expression of a legal event, of decisions and discretions made legible by 
the conflation of legal experience and imaginary literary sentiments. Indeed, 
literature here came to play the law and, to the extent that it embraced the 
literary representation of femininity, it did so at times to the benefit of women: 
it was through figures, presumptions, fictions, and dreams, through the 
imaginary, the other, the aesthetic, through a certain novel ecriture as well as 
ethical argument that legal change occurred. 
Fortescue and Selden derive what may properly be described as an image of 
woman from a lost genealogy or historical memory of femininity. It is also, in 
terms of its representation, under the sign of Polyhimnia, 124 the femininity of 
memory as reminiscence, whereby 'out..of one thing remembered others are 
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discovered'. 125 Jani Anglorum maps the places of women in the repressed, 
neglected or forgotten history of common law. It is possible that this narrative 
of the feminine in common law, of custody or custom as creativity and of 
tradition as generation, is to some large degree linked to the literary 
recollection of women, to gynaetopia and its illustrious women. In the City of 
Ladies it is after all Justice - defined as measure - who comes to the dreamer in 
1404 and offers to people the City, the feminine commonwealth, with women 
of reason, prerogative, and honour. 126 Justice is the third Lady but the chief 
virtue, and she represents a juridical history of illustrious women. In the 
ensuing tradition, it is not only the task of literary femininism to chart the 
narrative of feminine excellence and erudition; 127 it also states the con-
stitutional case for the right and sovereignty of women in. the varied spheres of 
their political experience. In such terms Agrippa, for example, remarks that 
'the English nation were most ungrateful, should they ever forget their 
obligations to this sex', or allow 'unjust laws, foolish customs, and an ill-mode 
of education' to continue to usurp their liberties. 128 For Agrippa, to continue 
with the same example, women's proximity to generation and reproduction 
granted them an ontological superiority as well as a mythological sovereignty, 
for: 
woman was formed miraculously ... (and) was the end, and last work of God, and 
introduced into the world, not unlike a Queen into a royal palace . . . Man seemed only her 
harbinger or attendant. 129 
The feminine was here the telos ofnature,just as for Selden Justitia, a woman, 
was the telos oflaw.130 
At one level, it might be argued that this concern with justice as feminine, as 
an image and end of law, simply spells out in hyperbolic manner the formulaic 
commonplaces of feminist and anti-feminist rhetorics. 131 In this sense, 
feminist argument, its exaggeration, speculation, and apocryphal histories, 
would simply represent the externality of the feminine to the legal: the image 
which is chosen to represent the system of law, the legal totality, would 
necessarily come from outside it. 132 In Fortescue's terms, the likeness oflaw is 
not the law itself and there, perhaps, is one reason why in Renaissance 
iconography the face of justice was blindfolded, self-consciously following a 
classical tradition of mutilated representations of virtue in which justice would 
not see the face of the litigants nor they the face of Iustitia. 13 3 If, as 
contemporary philosophy suggests, 'the face is presence' and command, and 
so neither metaphor nor figure, a feminine representation which is blindfolded 
would thereby be disallowed full presence, just as a woman could not 
command, except by way of exception. 134 Yet the argument made is that 
where law sought to be blind, the feminine face of justice looked back so as to 
see. To consider further the significance of the face to law, it is necessary to 
return to the querelle and to contemporary rhetorics of gesture. In generic terms: 
by the outward countenance we do judge of the qualities and disposition ... the most 
pliable part of virtue, is by greatest observance planted in the most proportionate 
feature.13 ' 
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The outward face is the 'judgment of nature', for vultus est index animi, the 
countenance and the eye are the sign of the soul. Yet as Fortescue and Selden 
made clear, the face is not without its ambiguities; it was neither infallible as an 
index nor permanent as a sign of inward disposition. 136 
The face is also sexed. The shamefacedness of women was designed to 
protect men from themselves and to protect them from sin. The blindfold on 
the face of justice seems plausibly to have also benefited men through the 
limitation, mutilation - it could also be a bandage - or sensory deprivation of 
women. The stake of such an effigy, shadow or image is never innocent. In a 
secondary sense, the blindness of justice can be taken to represent the peculiar 
folly of common law in its dependence upon the blind reason of precedent and 
the unseeing eye of an aural or auricular tradition. In common with other 
critiques of common law, particularly that contemporaneously associated 
with the English civilians, 13 7 the argument would be that without some vision 
of the peculiarities of parties and the particularities of circumstance and 
experience, the law has no connection with reality but simply and stupidly 
repeats past judgments as if they were both reason and law. Such repetition of 
judgment stipulates the present instance as a predicate of the past instance, 
without reason, foresight or ethics. The Woman 's Lawyer challenged that 
predication and in constructing the law as it related to the various aspects of 
women, suggested that it is through the specific character, experience, and 
reason of judgment, through what the ancients termed synderesis, 138 that legal 
personality is formed and the plurality of faces of women are distributed 
through the institutions and relations that constitute the social world for us. 
Finally, if such baroque retrospection multiplies our images of woman at 
law, it does so perhaps by holding to her face a broken mirror - the very 
emblem of distortive retrospection. But it would be wrong to suppose that the 
truth of history is not also the effect of accident or crisis, that the many faces of 
the common law itself do not reflect its ambiguous relation to its past. The 
common law had no single identity: its polity was plurality and its history 
Janus-faced. In breaking away from Rome and the civilian tradition, the 
common lawyers were forced to invent a unitary national law, to find a 
representation which would bind together its disparate legal practices. The 
solution, in the form of an image, was that of a local and particular tradition of 
precedent, based upon a law that was /esbia regula or pliable rule, 139 drawing 
upon the infinite uses of experience and a custom conceived as connatural to 
the people.140 To represent the separate and local features of the common law 
required the most misogynist of doctrinal writers to emphasize the distinctive 
and particular character of common law in terms of what would both then and 
now be perceived as feminine characteristics. The crises of the national law 
forced it to abandon the paternal regulae or rules of Rome, to represent 
instead the fecundity, the antique douceur of common law, to show the second 
face of the English Janus, namely, that of women: either Fate or Justice, 
Fortune, Nature, Prudence or Phronesis as occasion might demand. 
The emblem of the feminine or, at least, the attribution of female 
characteristics allowed the reassertion or even the apparent rescue of common 
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law from the harsh or, at least, foreign imposition of the civilian tradition. 
Humanism consistently argued by reference to the 'great Ladie of Learning ... 
true Philologie' and through her referred to even earlier, older or more pristine 
textual sources. 141 It was implicit in the philological form of humanistic 
argument both that the most ancient_ source was the true source but also that 
time and diligence would constantly uncover new antiquities. In short, just as 
common law was shown to precede Roman law, so other insular laws were 
shown to antedate the common law. Prior to Edward the Confessor's 
unification of the kingdoms of Albion into one common law, the philologist 
could discover several other laws, the regencies both of feminine monarchs 
and before them of venerable goddesses. The priority of antiquity forced the 
possibility of feminine governance upon the common law, if only as its other 
face or exceptional past. These were the stories, the feminine genealogies of the 
greatest antiquity, ofan original age of women: 'that is truth which is first, that 
is adulterous which comes after' .142 It is not surprising in this context that 
certain common lawyers even went so far as to suggest the recognition of 
feminine difference in the positive form of political suffrage, and civil and 
domestic rights. Insofar as elements of common law changed, it is not 
incorrect to say that legal events altered the 'relative or civil' definitions of 
women. 143 It is also plain that such civil definitions of feminine status were 
relative to male governance and relative further to the loss or repression of the 
feminine genealogies which renaissance lawyers had briefly recollected. To 
understand that failure, loss or forgetting of a specific history and its texts, it is 
necessary to return again to the question of difference. 
CONCLUSION: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DIFFERENCE 
The simultaneous praise and denigration or assimilation of the feminine is 
traditionally played out over a series of ambiguous and often antagonistic 
metaphors. Women, in the theological language which underpinned the 
ecclesiastical law, were images, surfaces or screens that lacked substance and 
depth.The feminine was empty and dissimulated or hid its emptiness through 
'sophistic reasoning and carnal pretence' .144 More than that, the feminine 
transgressed the orders of nature and, like the plastic image, polluted the spirit 
by confusing it with sense. In one respect, this reference to sense was a mark of 
the contingency under which the feminine travelled. Contingency implied 
both the realm of the inessential, of the aesthetic, the floral, 145 the inconstant, 
the gustatory, ornamental, and emotive, but also, by virtue of the particularity 
of the contingent, the feminine had symbolized justice, the law of the event and 
of the parties to dispute. In this latter aspect, the feminine was a sign of 
contingencia or touch, of a materiality, historicity, locality or relation which 
theology and ecclesiatical law often labelled unclean or polluted, of sense and 
flesh and earthly pleasure (erato) .146 The belief that 'the feminine power 
prevailed in Heaven' was even listed in the Repertorium Canonicum as the 
heresy of the Sethiani. 147 
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Women, by having no fixed value, by virtue of their uncertainty and 
ephemerality as also by virtue of their worldliness or reproductive force, were 
a threat not simply to the temporal order of political sovereignty but also to 
the logic of common law. This had inherited both Roman and ecclesiastical 
conceptions of universalia and with them, the notion of lawful meaning as a 
transcendent or spiritual property of eternal decrees and the reign of a reason 
that moved from like to like within the inexorable realm of the same. 148 The 
belief in contingent values and in the arbitrary temporal power of fortune and 
fate, were pre-Christian elements of a Stoic philosophy which natural law had 
specifically replaced. 'Experience', in the words of one influential lawyer 
'which is wholly gained by the observation of particular things is slow, blind, 
doubtful, and deceivable, and truly called the mistress of fools' .149 This 
mistress has an ambivalent and charged position in common law. As 
Fortescue had earlier remarked it was experience - induction - which 'by the 
assistance of the senses and the memory' discovered law. 1 so It was the 
vernacular experience of the /eges terrae which the common law judges had to 
apply and which differentiated common law from civil law, England from 
Rome. 151 The common law had to assert a certain femininity , a reliance at 
least upon the mistress of experience, to identify itself as a separate form of 
law. Common law was like a woman but likeness was not essence, similarity 
was not identity and so experience remained a medium but not a source oflaw. 
To experience, which is characterized doctrinally as a feminine vice and 
opposed to the speculations, regu/ae, and maxims152 of the universal law, 
might be added contingency and· materiality as such. The vice of femininity 
was precisely its nature, its plurality, both its diversity and its ability to 
reproduce, both its inconstancy over time and its production of difference. 153 
As one study has recently detailed, the category of the feminine in law was not 
simply plural but its attributes would change with time and historical 
circumstance. The virtues of the feminine might later be the attributes of the 
masculine, the value of contingency might latterly be the criterion of reason or 
the source of law, for nothing was certain in the realm of experience nor was 
anything constant where a feminine reason threatened to play the role of 
law.1s4 
The argument traced through the texts suggests that there was no singular 
category of woman and as Sir Robert Filmer argued of the law in a rather 
different context, 'there is great difficulty in discovering, what or who a 
[woman] is'. 155 The plurality of concepts and usages of 'woman' range from 
the female as an image or, worse, an idol in puritanical legal thought, the 
bearer of diabolical powers, soothsayer and magician, to the praise of 
illustrious women, female gods, muses and lawmakers whose soul and reason 
are indistinguishable from or superior to that of men. 1 56 There is no common 
essence to the various categories of women nor, indeed, is there any common 
definition of women in law.15 7 The 'feme sole' may share certain attributes of 
the married woman or 'feme covert'. The concubine may be granted certain 
aspects of the legal recognition of the wife. Unmarried women may in certain 
respects resemble the dowager lady. But the differences between statuses, 
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between having a will and the civil death of marriage, between being sui iuris 
and a/ieni iuris, namely, between being in the potestas or power of the 
husband, or of the father and having independent status at common law, 
between the figure of women as indigni in the ecclesiastical law of succession, 
the detior conditio of civil law and the exclusion of women from office in Salic 
law, are too great to allow for the construction of any single concept of the 
feminine. For the purposes of the ecclesiastical law on witchcraft, it should be 
noted, finally, that even the civil law test of gender, as adopted by Bracton 
from the Digest158 to distinguish the sex of the hermaphrodite, was 
inapplicable in that it was precisely the power of the witch to work wonders 
(mirum), to deceive the eye and so to appear in the form of the dead or the 
masculine or animals that constituted both an office and a proof of being a 
witch.159 
The latter example indicates both the power and threat constituted by 
femininity and its difference. To recollect the texts offeminine genealogies is to 
recollect an order of difference, a separate terrain and time offeminine kinship 
and regency approximating in myth or historical narrative to early law~ In 
terms of legal history, the speech or mythology .of female deities and women 
lawgivers had the status either of fabulous (and idolatrous) tales Qr, in 
Heywood's words, they were 'a fantasme, or an apprehension of an imaginarie 
thing' whose essence could not lawfully be sought. 160 The negative 
connotations of difference linked the mythology of feminine genealogies to 
inconsequence or to heresy within the normative gaze of a common law that 
owed much to its ecclesiastical derivations. Under the category of difference 
were listed all the figures of exclusion, while the place of feminine difference 
was aligned with the gynaeceum, with the private, with the infantile, with 
impermanence and fantasy . 161 It remains to be argued that returning, as this 
paper has endeavoured, to the mythologies of femininity in the ancient 
customs of common law may yet prove to be an important resource for 
feminist critiques of common law. 
For early feminine critiques of law, the difference of the feminine was a 
powerful argument for a separate and positive status and law for w'omen. The 
City of Ladies proposed a literal gynaetopia, a castle (for tuna) or a community 
of virtuous women kept separate from the world of men so as to pursue their 
virtue and their talents, to read, to learn, and to educate in female 
commonality free from the demands and the degradations imposed by the 
medieval world. In A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Mary Astell later makes a 
similar suggestion. The proposal was to establish institutions for women, 
similar to religious houses, in which women could retreat from the world to a 
discipline, education, community, and charity of their own. The purpose of 
this gynaetopia was also political. It aimed to 'amend the present and improve 
the future age' .162 The regime of the community was again to be scholarly and 
studious: it would endeavour through learning to expel the 'cloud of ignorance 
which custom has involved us in . . . that the souls of women may no longer be 
the only unadorned and neglected things'. 163 The proposal thus aimed to 
establish the value and the worth of women, to promote a philosophy of the 
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feminine as well as a society dedicated to the furtherance of the education of its 
own sex. The regime of this collectivity was to reflect a society 'whose soul is 
love' and whose kinship was friendship . 164 In a practical and political manner, 
the proposals of gynaetopias suggest a species of return to what Irigaray terms 
the forgotten feminine genealogies or 'to certain ancient but very advanced 
traditions in which it was the women who inititiated the men into love' and 
into the relationships and subjectivities, the politics and the civilities of 
eros.16s 
In a series of recent texts, contemporary feminists have suggested a return to 
the politics of difference. At one level the argument has been that it is essential 
to recognize and give space both to feminine difference and to the differences 
within the feminine. Thus, legal feminists have taken up the cause of a right to 
subjectivity, to care, and to relationship which emerged from a psychological 
study of the 'different voice' of the feminine. 166 In a more sophisticated vein, 
feminist jurisprudence has asserted the need to allow a rhetoric or writing of 
the feminine, a speech authentic to feminine differences and so also a series of 
rights and legal protections for the sphere, space, time or speech of 
femininity. 167 Utilizing the much frequented Sophoclean tragedy of 
Antigone, an argument is made for an 'other' law of the feminine which 
respects both nature and spirit, ecology and divinity, 'for in that time of 
feminine legal right, civil order was tied to respect for the gods and the civil and 
religious powers were not yet dissociated.' 168 The recourse to tragedy, to the 
dramatic representation of myth, is in effect a recourse to a series of political 
demands for respect for and guarantees of difference. In place of the demand 
for equality or for the legal right to be the same, Irigaray, for example, argues 
for an urgent and simple series of juridical reforms designed to establish a 
sphere of objective legal protections for feminine difference, namely, for a 
separate legally protected identity and full civic personality for the feminine 
and for the plurality which the feminine represents. The domains of sexually 
engendered identities and rights would reconstitute the law of persons 
according to a primary difference, that of sex: 
Out of fidelity to sexual liberation and to the changes in the political horizon which it 
provoked, and further to permit a cultural cohabitation between the sexes, it is necessary 
to endow both women and men with rights corresponding to their respective needs. 169 
The legal right to difference, to a juridically protected sphere of autonomous 
feminine differences, would require a considerable re-writing both of law and 
of legal method. In an immediate sense, the right to a separate legally 
guaranteed civil identity ranges from protection of the physical, moral, and 
imagistic personalities of women, to genuine maternity rights free of 
economic, ideological (conjugal) or insititutional constraints, and a right to a 
culture, to languages, religions, arts, and sciences appropriate to the 
autonomy of feminine identities. 170 In a broader sense, it is argued that civil 
law needs to be reformed so as to take account of the participation of two 
autonomous persons, two sexes, two genres, in love as also in the other 
relations of private and public life. 1 71 Essential to this transformation is a 
recognition of rights of speech, a recognition of the other as an irreducible 
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source of meaning, a recognition which would entail a certain respect for the 
mythologies, the languages, the figures, and the fictions of feminine 
genealogies. What is disclosed in this move to a jurisprudence of difference is 
the direct significance of law in the reconstruction of sexual ethics. It is the 
curious dialectic of this essay to suggest that the identity of the feminine and 
the 'objective rights and laws' which are to guarantee its autonomy are also the 
sites of the disappearance of any singular identity or unitary essence of the 
feminine. What is left, at least in theory, is the right and speech of women 
identified with a lineage or genealogy oflaw and of meaning transmitted from 
mother to child as well as from father to son. In this context the forgotten 
history of feminine genealogies and of various gynaetopias can offer a juridical 
narrative of the feminine genre and a language of difference as a practical sign 
of reciprocal right. Without embarking upon details of legal substance, the 
model of one law faced by or in juxtaposition with another is one of the oldest 
and most interesting of the histories of common law. One law on the other was 
the history of utrumque ius, the relation of the ecclesiastical to the 'profane' 
jurisdictions and of the spiritual to the secular laws. At various points in the 
history of the relation between jurisdictions, the same civil transaction, for 
example, would be tried before both spiritual and secular courts, either pro 
laesionefidei or upon a temporal contract, and would be decided according to 
two separate laws, according to faith and corporal penance, and according to 
profane law and its monetary compensations. 172 There is no reason, either in 
history or in doctrine, why different laws cannot govern different genres, 
separate statuses or the plural identities of legal persons. 
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London: Society of Stationers) at sig. B i b depicting 'as in a glass those Civill and 
Ecclesiasticall !awes testementary now in force, and to be observed and executed in the 
Ecclesiasticall Courts within this realm of England'. J. Godolphin, The Orphan 's Legacy or A 
Testamentary Abridgement i,i three Parts (1677, London: C. Wilkinson). Generally, see M . 
Ingram, Church Courts, Sex and Marriage, 1570-1640 (1987). 
38 Fortescue, op. cit. , n . 9, at p. 192. 
39 This issue is debated at some length in T. Wood, Some Thoughts Concerning the Study of the 
Laws of England(l727 ed., London: J. Stagg). For.details, see E. Coke, The First Part of the 
Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary on Littleton. not the name of a lawyer 
only , but of the law itse/f(l629, London: More). 
40 A. Holman, op. cit., n. 18, pp. 268-9: 'we can say that this rule is a chief work of nature with 
which she wished to honour France above all other nations of the world ... France has this 
advantage, that of never having loosened the natural order of their Realm'. 
41 Fortescue, op. cit. , n. 9, p. 240. 
42 id., p. 239. 
43 id ., p. 224 (decora estfacie et venusta aspectu). 
44 Maclean, op. cit. , n. 5, ch. 7. See, also, D . Curtis and J. Resnik, 'Images of Justice' (1986) 96 
Yale Law J. 1727. 
45 See Thomas Heywood, Tunaikeion or Nine Bookes of Various History concerninge Women 
(1624, London: Adam Islip) at 27. See also P. Goodrich, 'Fate as Seduction: The Other Scene 
of Legal Judgment' in Closure and Critique in Contemporary Legal Theory, ed. A Norrie (I 993). 
46 Fortescue, op. cit. , n. 9, p. 249. 
47 id., p. 250 (nam lice/ nomen justicia generis sit femini . .. ipsa non est femina neque sexus 
feminint). 
48 R. Allestree, The Ladies Calling (1677, London: n.p.) at 68-9: '[of widows] ... the remains of 
her husband be of three sorts, his body, his memory and his children ... the more valuable 
kindness, is that to his memory, endeavouring to embalm that, keep it from perishing, and by 
this innocent magick .. . she may converse with the dead, represent him so to her own 
thoughts, that his life may still be repeated to her; and as in a broken mirror the refraction 
multiplies the Images, so by his dissolution every hour presents distinct ideas of him, so that 
she sees him the oftener, for his being hid from her eyes'. On memory more generally, see M. 
Carruthers, The Book of Memory (1990). 
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49 Fortescue, op. cit., n. 9, p. 23 I , citing Isidore of Seville. 
50 id., p. 232. 
51 id., pp. 233-4. 
52 Num. 27: 4-5, 7-9. 
53 Fortescue, op. cit., n. 9, p. 268. 
54 id., pp. 251-9. 
55 Causa xxxiii, Quaest . 5, ch. Haec Imago. 
56 Fortescue, op. cit., n . 9, p. 287. 
57 id., at pp. 300-2. 
58 id., at p. 326. 
59 J. Perkins, A Profitable Book Treating of the Lawes of England (1532, 1555 ed., London: R . 
Tote!) at s. 86-7 . 
60 id., at s. 6. 
61 id., at s. 8. See, further, H . Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills , very 
profitable to be understood of all subjects of this realme of England (1590, 1635 ed., London: 
Society of Stationers; Godolphin, op. cit., n. 37. 
62 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Ang/arum (1583, London: H. Midleton) at 19. 
63 William Rastell, The Expocision of the Termes of the Lawes of Englande (1566, London: R. 
Totell); J. Cowell, The Interpreter or Book containing the Signification of Words (1607, 
Cambridge). Both authors list mulier in a technical meaning, as lawfully born rather than 
bastard: ex muliere as opposed to ex concubina. Both dictionaries nonetheless provide 
definitions of relevant legal statuses such as patria postestas, coverture or maritagium. 
64 Selden, op. cit., n. 9. 
65 id., at sig. A 2 a. 
66 id., at sig. A 2 a. 
67 id., at sig. A 4 a. 
68 id., at p. 94. 
69 id., at sig. A 3 b. 
70 id ., at pp. 4-5. For a further and contrary discussion of the three Furies - Alecto (or 
Luctificia), Tesiphone, and Megaera - see Heywood, op. cit., n. 45, at pp. 47-50, where they 
are listed as 'infernal Goddesses' . See also J. Selden, De Diis Syris Syntagmata II (1617, 
London: G. Stansby). 
71 Selden, op. cit. , n . 9, at p. 5. 
72 id. , at p. 6. (As, fo~ example, in 'fortnight') . The gender of night, of course, has many further 
significant conno~ations, some of which can be pursued in Juliana Schiesari, The Gendering of 
Melancholia: Feminism , Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of Loss in Renaissance Literature 
(1992). See, also, J. Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989); and, most 
recently, Anne Juranville, La Femme et la Melancholie (1993). 
73 Selden, op. cit., n. 9, at pp. 18-19. 
74 L. Lloyd, A Briefe Conference of Divers Lawes: Divided into Certaine Regiments (1600, 1602 
ed., London: Creede) at 90. (The source of the argument, ironically, is Aristotle, Politics ch. 7). 
75 Selden, op. cit. , n. 9, at p. I 8. 
76 id., at p. 21. 
77 See Maclean, op. cit., n . 5, at pp. 29-31, 38-39; the polarities of argument are also analysed in 
Maclean, op. cit., n. 10, pp. 2-5. 
78 Selden, op. cit. , n. 9, at pp. 19-21. Lloyd, op. cit. , n. 74, at pp. 91-2, offers a similar list. 
79 Selden, id., at p. 20. 
80 Selden, op. cit. , n. 70, at pp. 124-5. 
81 See generally, H .C. Agrippa, Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Aries and Sciences (1575, 
London: Bynneman). 
82 W. Perkins, A Discourse on the Damnable Art of Witchcraft; so farre forth as it is revealed in 
Scripture, and manifest by true experience (1610, Cambridge: Legge) at fol. 6 a-b. 
83 id., at 27-28. To prove the crime of witchcraft required not simply proof that spells had been 
cast or imprecations uttered - anyone could do that - but also that the spell or curse had 
caused harm to, or the death or illness of its intended victim. It is on the question of how such 
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proofs should be elicited that Sir Robert Filmer, An Advertisement to the Jury-Men of 
England Touching Witches (1653, London: Royston) especially at 3- 5, challenges Perkins. 
84 Selden, op. cit. , n. 9, at p. 11. Compare Elyot, op. cit., n. 21 , at sig. C iii a - C iv b, who 
particularly stressed this point. Not only is reason, as an aspect of the soul, by nature both 
male and female, but prudence, the feminine quality of prudentia or foresight by which the 
exercise of judgment is made possible, is a female art. 
85 Selden, id. , at p. 21. 
86 John Case, Sphaera Civitatis (1588, Oxford) at 40--1 , cited and discussed in Maclean, op. cit. , 
n. JO, at pp. 60---1. On broader issues of interpretation, see I. Maclean, Interpretation and 
Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (1992). 
87 Knox, op. cit., n. JO, at pp. 40 and 58. 
88 Bishop Aylmer, An Harborowe for Faithful/ and Trewe Subjectes against the late blowne 
blaste, concerning the government of women (1559, Strasborowe) at fol. K 4 b - Li a. 
89 id., at fol. E 4 b. 
90 Leslie, op. cit., n. 13, at fol. 57a-b. His other major statement on women was the more 
derivative De Il/ustrium Foeminarum in Republica Administrandi, ac ferendis legibus 
authoritate (1580ed., Rheims: J . Fognaeus) which lists erudite women (eruditae mulieres) and 
urges Queen Mary upon England . 
91 id. (1569], at fol. 59a. 
92 id., at fol. 75a-b. 
93 id., at fol. 137 b. 
94 W. Heale, An Apologiefor Women (1609, Oxford: J . Barnes) at 25-6 (citing Code 9.7). 
95 id. , at p. 28. W. Perkins, Christian Oeconomie: or a Short Survey of the Right Manner of 
Erecting and Ordering a Family, according to the Scriptures (1609, 1618 ed., Cambridge: 
Cantrell Legge) at 688.I indicates that a wife may leave her husband ifhe fails to protect her 
from a stranger or if the husband threatens harm. Sir Thomas Ridley, A View of the Civille 
and Ecclesiastical/ Law (1607, 1676 ed.) at 82: ' if any man beat his wife for any other cause, 
than for which he may be justly severed or divorced from her, he shall for such injury be 
punished' . 
96 Heale, op . cit., n. 94, at p. 46. J . Godolphin, Repertorium Canonicum or, An Abridgement of 
the Ecclesiastical Laws of this realm consistent with the Temporal (I 678, 1687 ed., London: 
Atkins) at pp. 507-8, cites Sir Thomas Simmond's Case as well as ecclesiastical doctrine to the 
effect that correction must be reasonable. Reasonable appeared to mean that the husband 
could use physical force to correct the wife but only where her offence was one for which the 
husband could sue for divorce. Interestingly, in light of the earlier discussion, Swinburne, op. 
cit. , n. 37, at p. 300 exempts the Queen from the exclusion of women from making wills 
without the consent of their husbands. 
97 Heale, op. cit., n. 94, at pp. 55-6. 
98 id., at pp. 49-50. Compare Calybute Downing, A Discourse of the State Ecclesiastical of this 
Kingdome, in relation to the Civil/ (1586, 1632 ed., Oxford: Turner) at 2- 3: 'good manners 
cause obedience, and religion naturally begets good manners .. . for although ill manners are 
per accidens the cause, or rather the occasion of making good laws, yet they are better in the 
executing, best when they are obeyed' . 
99 On the development offictions, see Perkins, op. cit ., n. 59, at p. 196; T. Wood, An Institute of 
the Laws of England (1720 ed., Savoy: Sare) at 101-4. 
100 See Swinburne, op. cit., n. 37, at pp. 80-4; Godolphin, op. cit. , n. 37, at pp. 31-5. 
IOI See Godolphin, op. cit., n. 96, at p. 507. 
102 id., at pp. 515-19. See, for example, Pollardv . Armshaw (1601) 75 ER 1073, or Dorothy Brian 
v. Cockman (1612) 79 ER 881. 
103 A line oflegislation which begins with a statute of 1486 (3 H . VII, c. 2) raising the penalties for 
carrying a woman away against her will that hath lands or goods. 
104 See, for example, Hyatt 's Case deciding the right of women to alimony, reported in 
Godolphin, op. cit., n. 96, at pp. 493-504; also, Wood, op. cit. , n. 99, at pp. 105-9. 
105 Anon., op. cit., n. 9. Some have attempted to attribute the work to Sir John Doderidge, 
author of, among other things, The English Lawyer(l629, 1631 ed., London: More) but there 
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is no compeHing evidence. Th~ work is ~riique in its scope in English law though it might be 
noted that there is orie German legal treatise that goes some way to achieving the same end: J. 
Wolff, Discursus: De Foeminarum injure civili et Canonico privilegiis, immunitatibus et 
praeeJ1!inenta (1615, Rostock:'M. Saxo). In contemporary terms, t_he notion of 'Wom~n's 
Law' has been resurrected in T . Stang-Dahl, Women's Law: An Introduction to Feminist 
Jurisprudence (1987), who defines the _purpose of women's law as being 't_o examine and 
understand how women are considered in law and how the law corresponds to women's 
reality and needs' (p. 12). See, also, and similarly S. Atkins and B. Hoggett, Women and the 
Law (1985) at I: 'we seek to understand how the law has perceived women and responded to 
their lives.' For a lengthy discussion, see S. Gibson; 'The Structure of the Veil' (1989) 52 
Modern Law Rev. 420. · 
I 06 See, for example, William Sheppard, The Touchstone of Common Assurances or a plain and 
familiar treatise, opening the learning of the common assur~nces or conveyances of the Kingdom 
(1648, London: W. Lee); Swinburne, op. cit. , n. 37, at sig. Bib. 
107 Anon., op. cit., n. 9, at p. 2. 
108 id., at pp. 403 and 3. 
109 id., at p. 3. 
110 id., at p. 128. 
Ill id. 
I 12 id ., at p . 129. 
113 id., at p . 206. 
114 id., at p. 305. 
115 id., at p. 232. 
116 id., at p. 233 . 
117 id., at p. 118. 
I 18 id., at p. 52, citing Stamford. 
119 id., at p. 206. 
120 id., at p. 146. See, for an earlier and equally powerful denunciation of this rule, Agrippa, op. 
cit., n. 21, at p. 31. 
121 id. , at p. 403 . 
122 id. , at pp. 22-3, giving as the reason that she is quickly able domui precesse, vivo subesse. 
123 id. , at p . 23. For further discussion, see, for example, Wood, op. cit., n . 99, at p. 19. 
124 Heywood, op. cit., n. 45, at p . 313 . 
125 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 105, at p. 15 (defining actus reminiscendi as one part of memory 
intellective). 
126 Pisan, op. cit. , n . 21, at sig. C ciii a. See, further, the prescriptions for gynaetopiain Astell, op. 
cit., n. 33, at pp. 40-5; and, also, the Castle of Fortuna, depicted in Christine de Pisan, Le 
Livre de la Mutacion de Fortune (1404, 1959 ed., Paris: Picard). For Pisan, justice was 
anything but blind. 
127 As in Leslie, op. cit., n. 90, pp. 23 ff.; see also Daniel Tuvil, Asylum Veneris, ora Sanctuary for 
Ladies {I 616, London: E. Griffin); and for a classic study of philosophical women, see Gilles 
Menage, Historia Mulierum Philosopharum (1690, trans. 1984, London: University Press of 
America). Most influential in England were Agrippa, op. cit., n. 21,; Vives, op. cit., n. 21,; and 
Elyot, op. cit., n. 21, all of whom list women philosophers amongst other illustrious women. 
128 Agrippa, id., respectively at pp. 66, 76. 
129 id., at pp. 10-13. 
130 Selden, op. cit., n. 9, at pp. 4-5. For contemporaneous examples, see Sir H. Finch, Law, or, A 
Discourse Thero/in Foure Books (1627, London: Society of Stationers) at II; W. Fulbeck, 
Direction or Preparative to the Study of Law (1599, 1829 ed., London: Clarke) at 2-3. 
131 A conclusion arrived at by Maclean, op. cit., n. 5, at p . 58. 
132 I have analysed this aspect of justice in P. Goodrich, 'Critical Legal Studies in England: 
Prospective Histories' (1992) 12 Oxford J . of Legal Studies 195, at 220-5. 
133 See Lloyd, op. cit. , n. 74, at pp. 130-1, for a direct expression of this view. 
134 Of the many contemporary analyses of the face, see E . Levinas, Otherwise than Being (1981) 
89-93; J . Derrida, Writing and Difference (1978) at 100 ff.; G . Deleuze and F . Guattari, A 
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Thousand Plateaux (1988) at 167-92; A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and 
Modernity (1985) at 76-9. 
135 Angel Day, The English Secretorie or Methode of Writing of Epistles and Le1ters (I 586, 1607 
ed., London: C . Burby) at 121-2. 
136 Richard Head, Proteus Redivivus, or the Art of Wheedling or Insinuation (1675, London: 
W.D.), respectively at pp. 2 and 256. See also at p . 53: 'the face is the index of the mind; yet 
experience tells us it is no infallible indicium of the nature or disposition of the person ... [for) 
always to see, is not to know'. See, also, M . Griffith, Bethel or, A Formefor Families (1633, 
London: Jacob Bloome) at p. 255: 'the visage is for the most part a prognostication_ of virtue 
or vice ... Yet thou may'st not trust too much to thine eyes ... Some women are like painted-
cloth; look on the one side, and thou seest Virgins, Virtues and Queens; but on the other, 
nothing but patches and rags ... '. 
137 See, for a particularly. strong example, Sir Robert Wiseman, The Law of Laws, or the 
Excellency of the Civil Law ( 1664, London: Royston) at pp. 38-45, discussing the failings of 
argument from precedent. More generally see B. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England (1973). 
138 In terms of the period in question, see the influential St. German, n. 35, at p. 81. See generally 
T .C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (1980). 
139 Sir John Davies, Le Primer Report des Cases en Ley Resolves et Adjudges in Les Courts de/ 
Roy en Ireland (1615, Dublin: Franckton) at fol. 4 a . 
140 id., at fol. 2 b - 3 a. 
141 Selden, op. cit., n. 9, at p . xix. 
142 John Favour, Antiquitie Triumphing over Noveltie (1619, London: Richard Field), pp. 39-40. 
(Id est verum quodcumque primum, id est adulteram quodcumque posterius.) 
143 Wood, op. cit., n. 99, at p. 17 advocates that the law of persons consider persons in 'their 
Natural, and in their Relative and Civil capacities' . 
144 R. Parker, A Scho/asticall Discourse against Symbolizing (1607, n.p.) at p. 10. 
145 On the 'misteries of Flora', see Lloyd, op. cit., n. 74, at p. 12; and more broadly on flowers, see 
G . Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (1589, London: Field). 
146 For striking theological examples, see, particularly, R. Parker, A Scholastical Discourse 
against Symbolizing (1607, private circulation) at pp. 7-8, 14-17, 19-21; N . Sander, A 
Treatise of the Images of Christ and,ofhis Saints (1624, Omers: Heigham); H . Hammond, Of 
Idolatry (1646, Oxford: H. Hall) atpp. 7-9, 12-13. This literature is discussed in greater detail 
in P. Goodrich, 'Antirrhesis: The Polemical Structure of Common Law Thought' in The 
Rhetoric of the Law, eds. A. Sarat and T . Keams (1993). 
147 J. Godolphin, op. cit ., n . 96, at p . 582. 
148 On the universa/ia oflaw, see Fortescue, op. cit., n. 35, at pp. 13-14; see also E. Kantorowicz, 
'The Sovereignty of the Artist. A note on legal maxims and Renaissance theories of Art' in E. 
Kantorowicz, Selected Studies (1965). 
149 Doderidge, op. cit., n. 105, at 240. 
150 Fortescue, op. cit., n. 35, at pp. 13-14. 
151 Fortescue, op. cit., n. 9, at pp. 20~, 'even the judges are bound by their oaths not to render 
judgment against the laws of the land (leges terrae)', and, similarly, see Selden, op. cit., n. 36, 
at p . 173. 
152 See, for example, William Noy, The Grounds and Maxims of the English Laws (1641 , 1757 ed., 
London: Lintot) at sig. D 3 b: 'every maxim is a sufficient authority to itself; and which is a 
maxim, and which is not, shall always be determined by the judges, because they are known 
to none but the learned' . More broadly on this point, see Sir Robert Wiseman, The Law of 
Laws, or the Excellency of the Civil law above all Humane Laws whatsoever (1664, London: 
Royston). 
153 On which, in philosophical terms, see L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (1985) 
especially 227-40; L. Irigaray, This Sex which is not One (1985) chs. 2 and 6. 
154 Jeanne Schroeder, 'Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in 
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence' (1990) 75 Iowa Law Rev. 1135, particularly at 1143-
47, 1214-17, indicating that at certain points in history, the values currently experienced as 
'uniquely female' were experienced as 'uniquely male'. 
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I 55 Sir Robert Filmer, op. cit., n. 83, at fol. A 3 a. 
156 See, particularly, in an English context, Agrippa, op. cit., n. 21; Vives, op. cit., n. 21; Elyot, 
op. cit., n. 21 ; Leslie, op. cit., n. 90. 
157 See Riley, op. cit., n. 5; D. Cornell, Beyond Accomodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction 
and the l,aw(l991); J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Jdentity(1990) . 
158 Digest 1.5.10: 'With whom is a hermaphrodite comparable? I rather think that each one 
should be ascribed to that sex which is prevalent in his or her make up'. 
159 Perkins, op. cit. , n. 82, at fol. 6 a-b, 22 a-27 b. For legislation and writs, see E. Coke, A Book 
of Entries containing perfect and approved presidents of Courts , Declarations ... and all other 
matters and proceedings (in effect) concerning the pratick part of the laws of England (1610, 
1671 ed., London: Streeter). 
160 Respectively, Selden, op. cit. , n. 70, at pp. 140-6, and Heywood, op. cit. , n. 45, at pp. 2- 3. 
161 For a legal definition of the gynaeceum, see A. Alciatus, De Verborum Significatione libri 
Quatuor (1635 ed., Lugudini: S. Gryphius) at 204 and 229. 
162 Astell, op. cit. , n. 3, at p. 40. 
163 id. , at p. 48. 
164 id., at pp. 81 and 91. 
165 Irigaray, op. cit., n. I, at pp. 103-5. See also lrigaray, op. cit., n. 8, at pp. 210-12. 
166 Particularly, C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982). For criticism of that study, see Joan 
Williams, 'Deconstructing Gender' (1989) 87 Michigan Law Rev. 797. See, also, 'Feminist 
Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation' (1985) 34Buffalo Law Rev. 11. For a 
series of stronger arguments in relation to difference and law, see Angela Harris, 'Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory' (1990) 42 Stanford Law Rev. 581 ; Patricia Cain, 
'Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories' (1990) 4 Berkley Women's Law J. 191; K. 
Crenshaw, 'A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics' in The 
Politics of Law, ed. D.Kairys (1990). 
167 For philosophical discussion of such rights, see J . Kristeva, 'Women's Time' (1981) 7 Signs 
13; C. Clement and H. Cixous, The Newly Born Woman (1986); H. Cixous, Coming to Writing 
(1991). 
168 Irigaray, op. cit., n. I, at p. 83. For a more detailed discussion, see L. Irigaray, Ethique de la 
Difference Sexuel/e (1984) 114-24. 
169 Irigaray (1992], op. cit., n. 8, at p. 205. 
170 On the latter right, see also Irigaray (1991], op. cit., n. 8. Also important in the discussion of 
cultural rights and literary styles was J. Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche 's Styles (1979). In terms of 
legal feminism, see the discussion in Mary Joe Frug, 'A Postmodern Feminist Legal 
Manifesto' (1992) 105 Harvard Law Rev. 1045. 
171 lrigaray, (1992], op. cit., n. 8, at 207. 
172 For an excellent discussion of this practice, see R. Cosin, An Apologie for Sundrie 
Proceedings by Jurisdiction Ecclesiastical/, of late times by some challenged (1591, London: 
n.p.) at 51-8. In explicitly feminist terms, see Mary Joe Frug, 'Re-Reading Contracts: A 
Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook' (1985) 34 Am. University Law Rev. 1065; and 
'Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law' (1992) 
140 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1029. 
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